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  Abstract:  Internet worms that spread autonomously from one host 
to another cause major problem in today’s networks. On 25th 
January 2003, “Slammer” was released into the internet and after 
ten minutes the worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts. 
Worms cause damage to the network by consuming its resources 
such as bandwidth. In this paper, we propose a method for detecting 
traffic signature for unknown internet worm. The proposed method 
has two algorithms. The first part is an Intelligent Failure 
Connection Algorithm (IFCA) using Artificial Immune System; 
IFCA is concerned with detecting the internet worm and stealthy 
worm. In order to reduce the number of false alarm, the impact of 
normal network activities is involved but TCP failure and ICMP 
unreachable connection on same IP address are not calculated 
because the internet worm  strategic attack on the different IP 
address. The second algorithm Traffic Signature Algorithm (TSA) 
is concerned with capturing traffic signature of the scanning 
internet worm. In this paper, we show that the proposed method can 
detect traffic signature for MSBlaster worm. 
 
Keywords: Internet worm Detection, Firewall, Generate 
Signatures, Router. 
1. Introduction 
Worms are widely regarded to be a major security threat 
facing the Internet today. Active worms spread in an 
automated fashion, which can flood the Internet in a very 
short time. Incidents such as Slammer worm that infected 
more than 90% of vulnerable machines within ten minutes 
on January 25th, 2003 [1] is the example of worms’ threats. 
Therefore, worm attacks present significant threats to the 
Internet. Flash Worms can attack with high speed of 
spreading, but stealth worms spread much slower that makes 
detection hard [11]. 
Anti-virus is the popular tool to combat worms. It used 
signature based technology [2] to detect worms. However 
the high spreading speed of worm results in anti-virus is less 
effective in detecting worms. Moreover, anti-virus cannot 
detect unknown internet worm automatically because it uses 
signature in detecting worms. Anti-virus compares the file 
structure of the worms with the signatures stored in its 
database. If they are matched, then the file is considered as 
has been infected by the worm. This required the anti-virus 
database to be frequently updated, so that it can detect new 
worms. This is the main reason why anti-virus cannot detect 
most of unknown internet worm automatically. Beside anti-
virus, firewalls and routers can be used to detect worm 
signature and block the worm, but this occurs only after the 
worm already spread. The worm generates an IP address and 
uses that IP address to communicate to potential victim, 
when the IP address is unused; the router returned an ICMP 
“Destination Unreachable” to infector computer [3] (see 
figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1.  ICMP message 
  
When the worm sent a SYN packet to a used IP address with 
destination port closed, TCP RESET packet is returned [3] 
(see figure 2). 
   
 
Figure 2.  RESET message 
 
The technology of internet worm detection is to check the 
way of the control message, such as ICMP destination 
unreachable message and RESET in TCP. 
In this work, we propose the AIS to compute a threshold that 
can help in detecting the Internet worm. In addition, we 
propose an intelligent way to compute the threshold range 
for detecting new types of worms. The False alarm of our 
proposed is reduced. Overall, the proposed of IFCA 
algorithm is concerned with detecting the rapid internet 
worm and stealthy internet worm, while TSA is concerned 
with capturing traffic signature of the internet worm. 
Schechter et al. [4] proposed worm detection method based 
on the failed connection. This algorithm can detect internets 
worm but does not work well on detecting stealthy worm. 
The threshold used in that algorithm cannot detect stealthy 
worm. 
Chen & Tang [5] analyzed the essential character of TCP-
based worm‘s propagation that sending out a large number 
of TCP connection requests. They proposed an effective 
approach to detect network worms based on the number of 
failure connection received by the network routers. The 
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approach can be divided into two phrases: short term and 
longer term. This strategy may works well on detecting 
randomly scanning worm and stealthy worm. However, the 
impact on normal network activities has not been considered.  
In addition, the rate of false alarms could be large and take 
long time to detect the worm. 
Yang et al. [6] proposed a worm detection algorithm that has 
two sub algorithms. The first sub algorithm, the “short term 
algorithm”, runs well to detect internet worm. While the 
second sub algorithm, the “longer term algorithm”, cannot 
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Table I.  Mechanisms Analysis 
 
The focus of this paper is on TCP-based worms. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the design and Experiments of intelligent failure 
connection algorithm. Section 3 describes the design of 
traffic signature algorithm. Section 4 discusses the 
Experiment result. Finally Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2. IFCA 
In this section, we present IFCA that based on Artificial 
Immune System; the Artificial Immune System recognize 
between self and non-self. An Artificial Immune System 
(AIS) is a bio-inspired classification system which is derived 
from the Human Immune System (HIS). AIS are one of the 
most recent approaches in computational intelligence. They 
provide efficient information processing capabilities [7]. 
IFCA appoints the difference between regular connection 
and worm connection. The worm scans different IP 
addresses every second. IFCA depends on the TCP failure 
connection and ICMP unreachable message on different 
random addresses. Therefore, there will be a large number of 
failure connections if the computer has infected by a worm.  
2.1 Design of IFCA 
IFCA mechanism records the number of failed connection 
packets such as ICMP and TCP RESET packets that are 
returned from the external destination address to the internal 
forged. It monitors source IP address placed in the router 
(see figure 3). Once detecting the first failed connection 
packets, the algorithm then extracts the source address, 
source port, destination address, and destination port from 
the packet and creates the record. The false positive rate is 
largely reduced when IFCA received normal connection, i.e. 
TCP SYN/ACK, “counter” will be decreased. Also, IFCA 
ignores the packet when the destination IP is recorded into 
the counter table because the internet worm attack strategy is 
“attacking different IP address”.  
 
Figure 3.  Error Message Returned to Router 
 
Only the first failed connection sent from the forged source 
IP address to different destination IP address is recorded. 
IFCA will remove the “counter” every three days.  
β =100/minute failed rate of threshold. Then X= (1 to n) 
average of failure connection (AFC) in one minute. 
AFC = Counter/Minute                                                       (1) 
IFCA can calculate the average of failure connection after 
five second when IFCA received first failure connection. 
Threshold can be processed by the following equation of 
Summation of threshold (ST):- 
ST = 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (β -X))                                       (2) 
Yang’s algorithm provides one threshold in long term 
algorithm therefore the process in this algorithm need long 
time for detecting stealth worm. 
The Yang’s algorithm [6] detects the internet worm if the 
failure connection is less than 100/minute failure 
connections by using “short term algorithm”. When the 
failure connection is equal or greater than 3000/day failure 
connection the Yang’s algorithm detects this type of stealthy 
internet worm by using “long term algorithm”. Our 
algorithm uses same Yang’s algorithm warning. 
 
Example (1) when we use Yang’s algorithm to detect the 
internet worm that has 3000/day failure connections, we can 
calculate the average number of failure connections when we 
use IFCA to detect same worm properties. The average 
number of failure connections will be: 
 3000/1440 (one day= 1440 minute )   
2.08333/minute (average of failure connections). 
Then ST will be: 
ST= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (β -X)) 
 ST= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (100 -X)) 
 ST= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (100 -2.08333)) 
 ST=3000 IFCA detects the worm after one day.  
IFCA and Yang algorithm are detecting the worm after one 
day (1440 minute). 
 
Example (2) when we use Yang’s algorithm to detect the 
internet worm that has 100/minute failure connections, in 
this case we can calculate the average of failure connections, 
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when we use IFCA to detect same worm properties and 
average of failure connection will be: 
 100/1 
 100/minute (average of failure connections). 
Then ST will be: 
ST= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (β -X)) 
 ST= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (100 -X)) 
 ST= 2^ (6.65 + 0.050054 (100 -100)) 
 ST=100 IFCA detects the worm on one minute.  
IFCA and Yang algorithm are detecting the worm on one 
minute. 
Our algorithm uses different threshold values over different 
time periods; therefore our method is faster than Yang's 
Algorithm when the worm is less than 3000/day or less 
100/minute failure connections. Also, IFCA detects the 
worm when that has greater than 3000/day failure 
connections, unlike Yang’s algorithm.  
The IFCA equation depends on the average of failure 
connection to compute the threshold. IFCA can detect the 
worm early in usual time. But if the worm cannot be detected 
n early stage, the algorithm provides more time and new 
threshold to detect the worm. 
IFCA can detect the worm by calculating different time on 
different number of failure connections. 
ST should be greater than fifteen. Else the traffic will be 
forwarded. 
T1= (ST / average of failure connection)                            (3) 
T2= (time now – time start of the algorithm)                      (4)        
Unlike Yang’s algorithm, IFCA is more dynamic in 
detecting the worm because it calculates the threshold every 
time. IFCA detects the worm by compare T1 to T2 as 
follows: If (T2 is small or equal to T1) and (the counter is 
greater than or equal to the summation of Threshold) the 
worm is detected. Else check T1, T2. If (T2 is greater than 
T1), then go to feed back and decrease the average with new 
calculation to give another chance to detect the worm. If T1 
small than T2, then the traffic will be forwarded because it is 
a normal connection.  Whenever the counter value does not 
exceed the threshold during time cumulative computation 
phase, the traffic sent from the corresponding IP address 
would be forwarded as normal activity (see figure 4).  
Figure 4.  The flow chart of the IFCA 
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2.2 Experiments of IFCA 
In this section, we describe the simulation experiments of 
IFCA to measure the effectiveness of detecting the rapid 
scanning worm and stealthy worm. 
Section 2.2.1 shows results for detecting rapid internet 
worm, section 2.2.2 shows results for detecting stealthy 
internet worm; section 2.2.3 shows the detection of other 
types of stealthy internet worms. The result in sections 2.2.1, 
2.2.2 and 2.2.3  are obtained by using the same types of 
worms that are tested on the two different algorithms namely 
Yang algorithm Yang et al. [5] and IFCA, and The key 
parameters used by IFCA and Yang algorithm are set as 
follows: 
 N=36000 the total number of vulnerable hosts 
I (0) =1number of initial infected hosts 
β =100/minute failed rate of threshold 
Rapid Scanning Worm rate =120/min, 150/min  
Stealthy Scanning Worm rate = 93 /min, 88/ min, 2360/day 
2.2.1 Detecting Rapid Scanning Worm 
Figures 5 and 6 show two types of worms that are detected 
using Yang et al. [6] algorithm. Figure5 shows the average 
of failure connections which is 120/minute, and the 
processing time to detect a worm is 50 sec. Figure 6 shows 
the average of failure connections which is 150/minute, and 
the processing time to detect the worm is 40 sec.  
 
Figure 5.  Yang algorithm detected the worm after 50 sec 
 
Figure 6.  Yang algorithm detected the worm after 40 sec 
Figures 7 and 8 show two types of worms that are detected 
using IFCA. Figure 7 shows the average of failure 
connections which is 120/minute, and the processing time to 
detect the worm is 25 sec. In figure 8, the average of failure 
connections is 150/minute, and the processing time to detect 
the worm is 7 sec.  
 
 
Figure 7. IFCA detected the worm after 25 sec 
 
Figure 8.  IFCA detected the worm after 7 sec 
It is noticeable that IFCA operates faster than Yang et al. [6] 
algorithm in detecting rapid internet worm. 
 
2.2.2 Detecting Stealthy Internet Worm  
Figures 9 and 10 show two types of worms that are detected 
using Yang et al. [6] algorithm. Figure 9 shows the average 
of failure connection which is 88/minute, and the processing 
time to detect a worm is 34min and 5sec Figure 10 shows the 
average of failure connection which is 93/minute, and the 
processing time to detect the worm is 32min and 15sec.  
Figures 11 and 12 show two types of worms that are detected 
by IFCA. Figure 11 shows the average of failure connection 
which is 88/minute, and the processing time to detect the 
worm is 103 sec. In figure 12, the average of failure 
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connection is 93/minute, and the processing time to detect 












Figure 11.  IFCA detected the worm after 103 sec 
 
 
Figure 12.  IFCA detected the worm after 82 sec 
This is proof that IFCA operates faster than Yang et al. [6] 
algorithm in detecting stealthy internet worm. 
 
 2.2.3 Detecting another Stealthy Internet Worm  
In this section, we used Yang algorithm to detect a worm. 
The worm has failure connection of 2360/day and the result 
after 30 hours is that the algorithm cannot detect this worm 
as shown in figure 13. Yang algorithm’s [6] has to check 
again the system after 24 hours. Yang algorithms cannot 
detect this type of worm. This worm has properties less than 
3000/day failure connection.  
In the second experiment, we used the IFCA to detect the 
worm. The worm has failure connection of 2360/day, and 





Figure 13.  Yang algorithm cannot detected the worm after 
30 hours 
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Figure 14.  IFCA detected the worm after 30 hours 
 
The results show that IFCA detects other types of worms, 
while Yang algorithm fails to detect these types of worms.  
3. TSA 
TSA mechanism detects traffic unknown internet worm 
depending on source IP address number that was returned by 
router so that we can collect the packet by using packets 
monitor. The mechanism depends on captures all the packets 
synchronization with successful replica from the infector to 
the victim 
 
TSA works when the worm is detected by IFCA, then 
internet worm signature can be detected by using traffic 
signature monitor.    
The different infection sequences might have different ports. 
For example, in the MSBlaster worm, the source ports vary 
with different infection sessions, which means the source 
ports can be changed, while the destination ports are fixed 
[9]. In this case, our mechanism uses the destination port for 
packet capturing. But other worms may have different 
strategy; the source port is fixed like Witty worm but 
destination port is changed [10]. In this case, our method 
uses the source port for packet capturing. The packet 
capturing means capture all packets between infector and 
victim when the port was opened at the victim side during 
sending request by the infector computer. 
The algorithm on focuses successful traffic synchronization 
and captures all these packets by the traffic signature 
monitor. In order to reduce the number of false alarm, the 
algorithm will check whether the destination IP is in the 
record. If the destination IP is in the record that means that 
the current connection is normal because the worm generates 
different IP addresses. If the traffic synchronization is not 
successful, the worm searches for other servers to infect it. 
The algorithm of TSA compares the packe 
ts and takes the successful synchronization of the packets 
that are similar in traffic synchronization, (See figure 15). 
Figure 15.  The flow chart of the TSD  
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The worm has a successful connection (see figure 16) where 
computer B is accepted the connection that includes the 
worm from computer A, because the worm generates 
random IP address in computer A and the same IP was used 
to connect to computer B. The worm will be transferred from 
computer A to computer B when the port in computer B is 
open. 
 
Figure 16.  Sequence of Infected Worm [8] 
4. Experiment Result 
This section show the experiment synchronization of worm 
was successful through TSA. When the worm is detected by 
IFCA, then internet worm signature can be detected by using 
TSA. The algorithm captures all the packets synchronization 
with successful replica from the infecter to the victim. TSA 
started from destination port for MSBlaster worm because 
the destination port is fix port while source port is not fix 
port. 
The traffic signature for MSBlaster worm is detected as 
follow. 
 
< TCP, X1 /infecter, 135/victim, SY N > 
< TCP, 135/victim, X1/infecter, SY N, ACK > 
< TCP, X1/infecter, 135/victim, ACK > 
< TCP, X1/infecter, 135/victim, RST > 
< TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, SY N > 
< TCP, 4444/victim, X2/infecter, SY N, ACK > 
< TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, ACK > 
< UDP, X3/victim, 69/infecter > 
< UDP, 69/infecter, X3/victim > 
< TCP, X2/infecter, 4444/victim, RST > 
Source port for X1, X2, and X3 are not fix port, while 
destination port is 135,4444,69 there are fix port. 
5. Conclusions 
The worm is very fast spread and the current techniques to 
detect the internet worms are slow. This paper presents a 
new method for detecting the worm and generating the 
traffic signature automatically. The results of the 
experiments show that the algorithm detected the traffic 
signature for MSBlaster worm. Also, the proposed algorithm 
can detect stealthy worm. 
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